The Board of Trustees of the Gov. Service Insurance System et al. vs. Velasco et al.; G.R. No. 170463

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 170463               February 2, 2011

THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as GSIS President and General Manager, Petitioners,
vs.
ALBERT M. VELASCO and MARIO I. MOLINA, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review¹ of the 24 September 2004 Decision² and the 7 October 2005 Order³ of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19 (trial court), in Civil Case No. 03-108389. In its 24 September 2004 Decision, the trial court granted respondents Albert M. Velasco⁴ and Mario I. Molina’s⁵ (respondents) petition for prohibition. In its 7 October 2005 Order, the trial court denied petitioners Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and Winston F. Garcia’s (petitioners) motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On 23 May 2002, petitioners charged respondents administratively with grave misconduct and placed them under preventive suspension for 90 days.⁶ Respondents were charged for their alleged participation in the demonstration held by some GSIS employees denouncing the alleged corruption in the GSIS and calling for the ouster of its president and general manager, petitioner Winston F. Garcia.⁷

In a letter dated 4 April 2003, respondent Mario I. Molina (respondent Molina) requested GSIS Senior Vice President Concepcion L. Madarang (SVP Madarang) for the implementation of his step increment.⁸ On 22 April 2003, SVP Madarang denied the request citing GSIS Board Resolution No. 372 (Resolution No. 372)⁹ issued by petitioner Board of Trustees of the GSIS (petitioner GSIS Board) which approved the new GSIS salary structure, its implementing rules and regulations, and the adoption of the supplemental guidelines on step increment and promotion.¹⁰ The pertinent provision of Resolution No. 372 provides:

A. Step Increment

x x x x

III. Specific Rules:

x x xx

3. The step increment adjustment of an employee who is on preventive suspension shall be withheld until such time that a decision on the case has been rendered. x x x x

Respondents also asked that they be allowed to avail of the employee privileges under GSIS Board Resolution No. 306 (Resolution No. 306) approving Christmas raffle benefits for all GSIS officials and employees effective year 2002.¹¹ Respondents’ request was again denied because of their pending administrative case.

On 27 August 2003, petitioner GSIS Board issued Board Resolution No. 197 (Resolution No. 197) approving the following policy recommendations:

B. On the disqualification from promotion of an employee with a pending administrative case

To adopt the policy that an employee with pending administrative case shall be disqualified from the following during the pendency of the case:

a) Promotion;

b) Step Increment;

c) Performance-Based Bonus; and

d) Other benefits and privileges.

On 14 November 2003, respondents filed before the trial court a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.¹² Respondents claimed that they were denied the benefits which GSIS employees were entitled under Resolution No. 306. Respondents also sought to restrain and prohibit petitioners from implementing Resolution Nos. 197 and 372. Respondents claimed that the denial of the employee benefits due them on the ground of their pending administrative cases violates their right to be presumed innocent and that they are being punished without hearing. Respondent Molina also added that he had already earned his right to the step increment before Resolution No. 372 was enacted. Respondents also argued that the three resolutions were ineffective because they were not registered with the University of the Philippines (UP) Law Center pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.¹³

On 24 November 2003, petitioners filed their comment with motion to dismiss and opposition.¹⁴ On 2 December 2003, respondents filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss.¹⁵ On 5 December 2003, petitioners filed their reply.¹⁶

On 16 January 2004, the trial court denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and granted respondents’ prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.¹⁷

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.¹⁸ In its 26 February 2004 Order, the trial court denied petitioners’ motion.¹⁹

In its 24 September 2004 Decision, the trial court granted respondents’ petition for prohibition. The dispositive portion of the 24 September 2004 Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and respondents’ Board Resolution No. 197 of August 27, 2003 and No. 372 of November 21, 2000 are hereby declared null and void. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.²⁰

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 7 October 2005 Order, the trial court denied petitioners’ motion.

Hence, this petition.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

On the issue of jurisdiction, the trial court said it can take cognizance of the petition because the "territorial area" referred to in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court "does not necessarily delimit to a particular locality but rather to the judicial region where the office or agency is situated so that the prohibitive writ can be enforced."

On the merits of the case, the trial court ruled that respondents were entitled to all employee benefits as provided under the law by reason of their employment. According to the trial court, to deny respondents these employee benefits for the reason alone that they have pending administrative cases is unjustified since it would deprive them of what is legally due them without due process of law, inflict punishment on them without hearing, and violate their right to be presumed innocent.

The trial court also found that the assailed resolutions were not registered with the UP Law Center, per certification of the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR).²¹ Since they were not registered, the trial court declared that the assailed resolutions have not become effective citing Sections 3 and 4, Chapter 2, Book 7 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.²²

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues:

I

Whether the jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 03-108389 (Velasco, et al. vs. The Board of Trustees of GSIS, et al., RTC-Manila, Branch 19) lies with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) and not with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19.

II

Whether a Special Civil Action for Prohibition against the GSIS Board or its President and General Manager exercising quasi-legislative and administrative functions in Pasay City is outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC-Manila, Branch 19.

III

Whether internal rules and regulations need not require publication with the Office of the National [Administrative] Register for their effectivity, contrary to the conclusion of the RTC-Manila, Branch 19.

IV

Whether a regulation, which disqualifies government employees who have pending administrative cases from the grant of step increment and Christmas raffle benefits is unconstitutional.

V

Whether the nullification of GSIS Board Resolutions is beyond an action for prohibition, and a writ of preliminary injunction cannot be made permanent without a decision ordering the issuance of a writ of prohibition.²³

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.

Petitioners argue that the Civil Service Commission (CSC), not the trial court, has jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 03-108389 because it involves claims of employee benefits. Petitioners point out that the trial court should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Sections 2 and 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provide:

Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

Sec. 4. Where petition filed. - The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it related to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)

Civil Case No. 03-108389 is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents prayed that the trial court declare all acts emanating from Resolution Nos. 372, 197, and 306 void and to prohibit petitioners from further enforcing the said resolutions.²⁴ Therefore, the trial court, not the CSC, has jurisdiction over respondents’ petition for prohibition.

Petitioners also claim that the petition for prohibition was filed in the wrong territorial jurisdiction because the acts sought to be prohibited are the acts of petitioners who hold their principal office in Pasay City, while the petition for prohibition was filed in Manila.

Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129)²⁵ provides:

SEC. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. - The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over which the said branch may exercise appellate jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall be exercised with a view to making the courts readily accessible to the people of the different parts of the region and making attendance of litigants and witnesses as inexpensive as possible. (Emphasis supplied)

In line with this, the Supreme Court issued Administrative Order No. 3²⁶ defining the territorial jurisdiction of the regional trial courts in the National Capital Judicial Region, as follows:

a. Branches I to LXXXII, inclusive, with seats at Manila – over the City of Manila only.

b. Branches LXXXIII to CVII, inclusive, with seats at Quezon City – over Quezon City only.

c. Branches CVIII to CXIX, inclusive, with seats at Pasay City – over Pasay City only.

x x x x

The petition for prohibition filed by respondents is a special civil action which may be filed in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial court, as the case may be.²⁷ It is also a personal action because it does not affect the title to, or possession of real property, or interest therein. Thus, it may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the plaintiff.²⁸ Since respondent Velasco, plaintiff before the trial court, is a resident of the City of Manila,²⁹ the petition could properly be filed in the City of Manila.³⁰ The choice of venue is sanctioned by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.

Moreover, Section 21(1) of BP 129 provides:

Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:

(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction,which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions; x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Since the National Capital Judicial Region is comprised of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Malabon, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela and the municipalities of Navotas, San Juan, Pateros, and Taguig, a writ of prohibition issued by the regional trial court sitting in the City of Manila, is enforceable in Pasay City. Clearly, the RTC did not err when it took cognizance of respondents’ petition for prohibition because it had jurisdiction over the action and the venue was properly laid before it.

Petitioners also argue that Resolution Nos. 372, 197, and 306 need not be filed with the UP Law Center ONAR since they are, at most, regulations which are merely internal in nature – regulating only the personnel of the GSIS and not the public.

Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP Law Center. Only those of general or of permanent character are to be filed. According to the UP Law Center’s guidelines for receiving and publication of rules and regulations, "interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the Administrative agency and not the public," need not be filed with the UP Law Center.

Resolution No. 372 was about the new GSIS salary structure, Resolution No. 306 was about the authority to pay the 2002 Christmas Package, and Resolution No. 197 was about the GSIS merit selection and promotion plan. Clearly, the assailed resolutions pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the personnel of the GSIS. There was no need for the publication or filing of these resolutions with the UP Law Center.

Petitioners insist that petitioner GSIS Board has the power to issue the assailed resolutions. According to petitioners, it was within the power of petitioner GSIS Board to disqualify respondents for step increment and from receiving GSIS benefits from the time formal administrative charges were filed against them until the cases are resolved.

The Court notes that the trial court only declared Resolution Nos. 197 and 372 void. The trial court made no ruling on Resolution No. 306 and respondents did not appeal this matter. Therefore, we will limit our discussion to Resolution Nos. 197 and 372, particularly to the effects of preventive suspension on the grant of step increment because this was what respondents raised before the trial court.

First, entitlement to step increment depends on the rules relative to the grant of such benefit. In point are Section 1(b), Rule II and Section 2, Rule III of Joint Circular No. 1, series of 1990, which provide:

Rule II. Selection Criteria

Section 1. Step increments shall be granted to all deserving officials and employees x x x

(b) Length of Service – For those who have rendered continuous satisfactory service in a particular position for at least three (3) years.

Rule III. Step Increments

x x x x

Section 2. Length of Service – A one (1) step increment shall be granted officials and employees for every three (3) years of continuous satisfactory service in the position. Years of service in the position shall include the following:

(a) Those rendered before the position was reclassified to a position title with a lower or the same salary grade allocation; and

(b) Those rendered before the incumbent was transferred to another position within the same agency or to another agency without a change in position title and salary grade allocation.

In the initial implementation of step increments in 1990, an incumbent shall be granted step increments equivalent to one (1) step for every three (3) years of continuous satisfactory service in a given position occupied as of January 1, 1990.

A grant of step increment on the basis of length of service requires that an employee must have rendered at least three years of continuous and satisfactory service in the same position to which he is an incumbent.³¹ To determine whether service is continuous, it is necessary to define what actual service is.³² "Actual service" refers to the period of continuous service since the appointment of the official or employee concerned, including the period or periods covered by any previously approved leave with pay.³³

Second, while there are no specific rules on the effects of preventive suspension on step increment, we can refer to the CSC rules and rulings on the effects of the penalty of suspension and approved vacation leaves without pay on the grant of step increment for guidance.

Section 56(d), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides:

Section 56. Duration and effect of administrative penalties. - The following rules shall govern in the imposition of administrative penalties: x x x

(d) The penalty of suspension shall result in the temporary cessation of work for a period not exceeding one (1) year.

Suspension of one day or more shall be considered a gap in the continuity of service. During the period of suspension, respondent shall not be entitled to all money benefits including leave credits.

If an employee is suspended as a penalty, it effectively interrupts the continuity of his government service at the commencement of the service of the said suspension. This is because a person under penalty of suspension is not rendering actual service. The suspension will undoubtedly be considered a gap in the continuity of the service for purposes of the computation of the three year period in the grant of step increment.³⁴ However, this does not mean that the employee will only be entitled to the step increment after completing another three years of continuous satisfactory service reckoned from the time the employee has fully served the penalty of suspension.³⁵The CSC has taken this to mean that the computation of the three year period requirement will only be extended by the number of days that the employee was under suspension.³⁶ In other words, the grant of step increment will only be delayed by the same number of days that the employee was under suspension.

This is akin to the status of an employee who incurred vacation leave without pay for purposes of the grant of step increment.³⁷ Employees who were on approved vacation leave without pay enjoy the liberal application of the rule on the grant of step increment under Section 60 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 41, series of 1998, which provides:

Section 60. Effect of vacation leave without pay on the grant of length of service step increment. - For purposes of computing the length of service for the grant of step increment, approved vacation leave without pay for an aggregate of fifteen (15) days shall not interrupt the continuity of the three-year service requirement for the grant of step increment. However, if the total number of authorized vacation leave without pay included within the three-year period exceeds fifteen (15) days, the grant of one-step increment will only be delayed for the same number of days that an official or employee was absent without pay. (Emphasis supplied)

Third, on preventive suspension, Sections 51 and 52, Chapter 7, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 provide:

SEC. 51. Preventive Suspension. - The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.

SEC. 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension. Pending Administrative Investigation. - When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. (Emphasis supplied)

Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty.³⁸ It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him.³⁹ If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated.

Therefore, on the matter of step increment, if an employee who was suspended as a penalty will be treated like an employee on approved vacation leave without pay,⁴⁰ then it is only fair and reasonable to apply the same rules to an employee who was preventively suspended, more so considering that preventive suspension is not a penalty. If an employee is preventively suspended, the employee is not rendering actual service and this will also effectively interrupt the continuity of his government service. Consequently, an employee who was preventively suspended will still be entitled to step increment after serving the time of his preventive suspension even if the pending administrative case against him has not yet been resolved or dismissed. The grant of step increment will only be delayed for the same number of days, which must not exceed 90 days, that an official or employee was serving the preventive suspension.

Fourth, the trial court was correct in declaring that respondents had the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. This means that an employee who has a pending administrative case filed against him is given the benefit of the doubt and is considered innocent until the contrary is proven.⁴¹

In this case, respondents were placed under preventive suspension for 90 days beginning on 23 May 2002.1avvphi1 Their preventive suspension ended on 21 August 2002. Therefore, after serving the period of their preventive suspension and without the administrative case being finally resolved, respondents should have been reinstated and, after serving the same number of days of their suspension, entitled to the grant of step increment.

On a final note, social legislation like the circular on the grant of step increment, being remedial in character, should be liberally construed and administered in favor of the persons to be benefited. The liberal approach aims to achieve humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security and well-being of government employees may be enhanced.⁴²

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the 24 September 2004 Decision and the 7 October 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19 in Civil Case No. 03-108389. WeDECLARE the assailed provisions on step increment in GSIS Board Resolution Nos. 197 and 372 VOID. WeMODIFY the 24 September 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19 and rule that GSIS Board Resolution Nos. 197, 306 and 372 need not be filed with the University of the Philippines Law Center.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA 
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA 
Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

¹ Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

² Rollo, pp. 34-37. Penned by Judge Zenaida R. Daguna.

³ Id. at 38.

⁴ Respondent Albert M. Velasco holds the position of Attorney V in the Department of Investigation.

⁵ Respondent Mario I. Molina holds the position of Attorney V in the Legal Department. Sometimes appears in the records as "Mario T. Molina."

⁶ Records, pp. 24-28.

⁷ Respondent Albert M. Velasco was also charged with violation of rules on office decorum and gross insubordination.

⁸ Records, pp. 35-36.

⁹ Id. at 19-23. Issued on 21 November 2000.

¹⁰ Id. at 37.

¹¹ Id. at 33-34. Issued on 23 October 2002.

¹² Id. at 5-18.

¹³ Id. at 38.

¹⁴ Id. at 42-46.

¹⁵ Id. at 49-52.

¹⁶ Id. at 53-58.

¹⁷ Id. at 68-70.

¹⁸ Id. at 83-88.

¹⁹ Id. at 140.

²⁰ Rollo, p. 37.

²¹ Records, p. 38.

²² SEC. 3. Filing. - (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party of persons.

(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.

(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to the public inspection.

SEC. 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them.

²³ Rollo, p. 157.

²⁴ Records, p. 16.

²⁵ The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.

²⁶ Dated 19 January 1983.

²⁷ Rules of Court, Sec. 4, Rule 65.

²⁸ Rules of Court, Sec. 2, Rule 4.

²⁹ Records, p. 7. In the petition for prohibition, respondent Velasco stated that his residence is "at 639-A Cristobal Street, Sampaloc, Manila."

³⁰ See Notre Dame de Lourdes Hospital v. Mallare-Phillips, 274 Phil. 467 (1991).

³¹ CSC Resolution No. 02-1479, Sison, Maricon – Re: Query; Step Increment, 8 November 2002.

³² Id.

³³ Section 28, CSC Memorandum Circular No. 41, series of 1988. Also known as the Revised Omnibus Rules on Leave.

³⁴ CSC Resolution No. 021564, Traspadillo, John Marlon M. - Re: Step Increment; Suspension as a Gap in the Service, 17 December 2002.

³⁵ Id.

³⁶ Id.

³⁷ Id.

³⁸ Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws. Section 24 provides:

SEC. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive measure.

³⁹ Juan v. People of the Philippines, 379 Phil. 125 (2000); Gloria v. Court of Appeals, 365 Phil. 744 (1999).

⁴⁰ CSC Resolution No. 021564, Traspadillo, John Marlon M. - Re: Step Increment; Suspension as a Gap in the Service, 17 December 2002.

⁴¹ CSC Resolution No. 992456, Asperilla, Dominador O. - Re: Special Leave Benefits; Query, 5 November 1999.

⁴² Tria v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 96787, 8 May 1992, 208 SCRA 834; Ortiz v. COMELEC, 245 Phil. 780 (1988).

Dabu vs. Roden et al.; A.M. No. RTJ-00-1600

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-00-1600^**               February 1, 2011

VIVIAN T. DABU, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, Complainant,
vs.
EDUARDO RODEN E. KAPUNAN, Presiding Judge, Branch 51 and Acting Judge, Branch 52,^* MA. THERESA CORTEZ, LEILA O. GALO, Both Court Stenographers, SUZETTE O. TIONGCO, Legal Researcher, All of Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Guagua, Pampanga, Respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

A.M. No. 01-3-138-RTC

RE: EVALUATION OF THE REPORT AND INVENTORY SUBMITTED BY EXECUTIVE JUDGE ROGELIO C. GONZALES, RTC, Guagua, Pampanga, ON ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE CASES IN BRANCHES 49, 50, 51, 52 and 53 OF THE GUAGUA REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:

Pursuant to the powers vested in the Court under Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,¹ the Court acts upon these two consolidated administrative cases against [1] Judge Eduardo Roden E. Kapunan (Judge Kapunan), then presiding judge of Branch 51 and acting judge of Branch 52, Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga (RTC); [2] stenographer Ma. Theresa Cortez (Cortez); [3] stenographer Leila O. Galo (Galo); and [4] Legal Researcher Suzette Tiongco (Tiongco), all of Branch 51, RTC, Guagua, Pampanga.

In A.M. No. RTJ-00-1600, complainant Vivian T. Dabu (Dabu) claimed that she was appointed 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor for Pampanga sometime in June 1999. In October of the same year, from her station in San Fernando, Pampanga, she was transferred and re-assigned to Guagua, Pampanga, to serve Branches 50, 51 and 52 of the RTC therein.

According to Dabu, just a few months into her assignment, she noticed that unlike in Branch 50, she was not being called upon to intervene or investigate cases involving annulment of marriages in Branches 51 and 52, both presided by Judge Kapunan, despite the fact that the cases for annulment of marriage were being raffled equally among the five (5) branches of the RTC, in Guagua, Pampanga.

Curious on what appeared to her as an oddity, and having previously learned that cases for annulment of marriage were being "fixed" in the said station, Dabu went to the Office of the Clerk of Court and got from its docket the list of annulment cases raffled to Branches 51 and 52 pertaining to the period from August 1, 1999 to March 2000. She then went to each branch and requested the records of the cases in the list. She then found out that the records were being falsified and made to appear that a prosecutor appeared during the supposed hearings of the annulment cases, when, in truth, the prosecutors who supposedly appeared were either on leave or had already been re-assigned to another station.

The other case, A.M. No. 01-3-138, stemmed from an article written by Atty. Emil P. Jurado (Atty. Jurado) in the November 1, 2000 issue of the Manila Standard. It reported that an RTC branch in Guagua, Pampanga, had been improperly disposing cases for annulment of marriage in "syndicated efforts involving court personnel and a public assistance office lawyer."

Determined to ascertain the truth of the allegations made in the article, then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. instructed Executive Judge Rogelio C. Gonzales (Judge Gonzales) of RTC, Guagua, Pampanga to submit inventories of marriage annulment cases filed in the five (5) branches of the RTC, Guagua, Pampanga, from January 1997 to November 2000.

In the evaluation² of the report and inventory submitted by Judge Gonzales, then Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez³ recommended that the matter be joined with the proceedings in A.M. No. RTJ-00-1600 so that "a complete picture and history of the anomalous treatment by Branches 51 and 52 of annulment of marriage cases" would be made.

In its Resolution⁴ dated March 13, 2001, the Court ordered the consolidation of A.M. No. 1-3-138-RTC and A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-1028-RTJ.

During the hearing of these cases, only Judge Kapunan and Tiongco participated. Cortez manifested that she would not adduce evidence in her behalf and would submit the case for disposition/recommendation on the basis of the records and evidence adduced during the investigation. Respondent Galo, on the other hand, neither appeared nor filed any comment or pleading.

The result of the investigation revealed something not expected of a proper judicial office. As reported in detail by the Investigating Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos⁵ (Investigating Justice) of the Court of Appeals:

On August 24, 2000, Complainant Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Vivian T. Dabu executed an Affidavit citing several incidents wherein the court records of cases for annulment of marriage, lost titles and declaration of presumptive death were being falsified. The Affidavit was treated as a Complaint for falsification of court records against Judge Eduardo Roden E. Kapunan and court stenographers Ma. Theresa Cortez and Leila O. Galo. Respondent Suzette Tiongco was not included in the charge of falsification of court records as complainant ha[d] no evidence linking her thereto but the Office of the Court Administrator included her with the charge of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Complainant alleged that during the period between November 1999 and August 2000, respondent Judge was the presiding judge of Branch 51 and the acting judge of Branch 52, both of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, with three (3) of the personnel of Branch 51, namely: Leila Galo, Ma. Theresa Cortez and Suzette Tiongco.

Respondent Judge and Galo were detailed to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48, at the same time and were returned to their original assignment at the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga also at the same time x x x.

Respondents Galo and Cortez were appointed to the position of court stenographers for Branch 51 x x x. However, respondent Galo, during the said period, did not perform the duties of a stenographer but acted as a secretary for respondent Judge x x x. She received all communications pertaining to respondent Judge or to cases pending before Branches 51 and 52 x x x. Respondent Judge gave specific instruction on this matter to the Court’s personnel x x x.

The other staff of Branch 51 (sic) holds office at the 3rd floor of Goseco hall, which is located across the municipal hall of Guagua, Pampanga. On the other hand, all of the staff of Branch 52 (sic) is holding office at the 2nd floor of Goseco Hall.

All the records of Branches 51 and 52 are being kept at the Goseco Hall except for the records of cases which have pending incidents to be resolved, or an Order/Decision for signature, or to be heard, or is needed by respondent Judge which are in the office of the respondents at the municipal hall x x x.

Prior to November 1999, the assigned prosecutor for Branch 51 is Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Domingo C. Pineda and for Branch 52 is former Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Reyes D. Manalo. Beginning 10 November 1999 up to 31 August 2000, herein complainant was the assigned prosecutor for Branches 51 and 52.

As evidence for the charge of falsification of court records, complainant presented the following cases:

1. Civil Case No. G-3655
Nonito Vitug vs. Gracita Sangan
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-52, Guagua, Pampanga

On 3 November 1999, there was allegedly a hearing which was held in the presence of former Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Reyes D. Manalo, wherein the plaintiff and the psychologist testified and, thereafter, the counsel of record, Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo, offered his evidence, and, without the objection of the public prosecutor, the case was deemed submitted for decision x x x. The minutes and transcript of stenographic notes were prepared by respondent Cortez.

On 9 November 1999, a Decision was rendered, which states on paragraph 3, page 1, thereof that "Prosecutor Reyes Manalo on November 3, 1999 submitted his Report that no collusion exists between the parties" but no such Report is attached to the records of the case x x x.

Former Prosecutor Reyes D. Manalo testified that as early as 25 October 1999, when he filed his Application for Leave for the month of November, he was already on leave and, from then on, has never appeared before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga until his retirement in June 2000 x x x. This was corroborated by the stenographer of said Court, Zenaida A.C. Caraan x x x.

In the criminal cases heard on 3 November 1999, respondent Judge issued Orders declaring the hearing on said date cancelled and resetting the same to another date in view of the absence of the public prosecutor x x x.

Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo, on the other hand, testified that none of the parties is his client and that he never appeared in the said case x x x.

2. Civil Case No. G-3675
Meriam Vitug vs. Edgar Faeldon
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga

On 12 November 1999, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Domingo C. Pineda allegedly issued a Manifestation finding no collusion between the parties x x x. He, however, testified that he did not issue any "Manifestation" in connection with this case x x x.

On 15 November 1999, a hearing was allegedly conducted in the presence of the said public prosecutor wherein the plaintiff testified and the case was re-set on 29 December 1999 for the presentation of the psychologist x x x. The minutes and transcript of stenographic notes were both prepared by respondent Cortez x x x.

However, the Orders in the criminal cases heard on the same date, 15 November 1999, which were also prepared by respondent Cortez and signed by respondent judge, stated that the hearing was cancelled in view of the absence of the public prosecutor x x x.

Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Domingo C. Pineda testified that he was, as of 8 November 1999, assigned to Branches 54 and 55 of the Regional [T]rial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga, and from then on, never appeared before Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga x x x. This was corroborated by the OIC-Branch Clerk of Court of the said Court, Eduardo P. Carlos x x x.

Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo again testified that none of the parties is his client and he never appeared in such case x x x.

The Decision in this case was included in the cases reported as having been decided or disposed of for the month of March 2000 x x x.

3. Civil Case No. G-3659
Ricardo Layug vs. Zerlina Arteta
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-52, Guagua, Pampanga

On 3 November 1999, a Manifestation was allegedly issued by former Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Reyes D. Manalo x x x but he testified that he did not issue the same x x x.

On 5 November 1999, a hearing was allegedly held in the presence of the said public prosecutor wherein the plaintiff and a psychologist testified, the counsel on record, Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo, offered his evidence and without the objection of the public prosecutor, the case was submitted for resolution x x x.

Again former Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Reyes D. Manalo and Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo denied any participation in the case.

4. LRC Case No. G-73
In re: Petition for Issuance of
Owner’s Duplicate Copy of
TCT No. 217416-R,
Rev. Fr. Francisco R. Lansang,
Petitioner,
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga

5. LRC Case No. G-74
In re: Petition for Issuance of
Owner’s Duplicate Copy of
TCT Nos. 441074-R to 441089-R,
Beatriz Lansang, Petitioner.
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga

On 25 November 1999, a hearing was allegedly held wherein the petitioners were presented, the counsel on record, Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo offered his evidence, and, thereafter, these cases were deemed submitted for resolution x x x. The minutes of hearing and transcript of stenographic notes were prepared by respondent Cortez x x x.

On December 6, 1999 separate Orders were issued granting the petitions favorably x x x. These cases were reported in June 2000 to have been decided or disposed of x x x.

Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo proffered the same testimony x x x.

6. Civil Case No. G-2579
Benito Samia, Jr. vs. Josephine L. Lorenzo-Samia
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga

On 21 February 2000, a Decision was rendered stating therein that a Psychological Evaluation Report was submitted but none appears on the record x x x.

Likewise, between 13 December 1999 and 21 February 2000, no other hearing was conducted despite the fact that the Order dated 13 December 1999 indicated the next hearing on 17 January 2000 and the dorsal side of page 111 of the record states "Reset 2/21/00" x x x. There was also no record that plaintiff offered his evidence, rested his case, or submitted the case for resolution x x x.

The said Decision was included in the monthly report of cases disposed of in June 2000 x x x.

7. Civil Case No. G-3717
Tomas Tamayo vs. Adoracion Sampang
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-52, Guagua, Pampanga

The plaintiff, Tomas Tamayo, testified that the case was filed by respondent Cortez before the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, after the latter agreed to help him in the "processing" of the annulment of his marriage; that he never appeared before any lawyer for the notarization of his Verified Petition; that he was initially told that there would be no hearing in his annulment case and it will be granted within three (3) months; that he gave the amount of Php 15,000.00 in connection thereto which was returned to him after he withdrew his case; that respondent Galo took from him Php4000.00 in payment of the "psychologist fee" which amount was not returned to him; that he gave the amount to respondent Galo after she identified herself as a court employee and even presented an identification card of respondent Judge x x x.

In his testimony, Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo stated that the plaintiff is not his client x x x.

8. Civil Case No. G-3677
Joseph Voltaire Datu vs. Marissa S. Tamarez
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-52, Guagua, Pampanga

On 11 April 2000, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo denying his signature appearing on the said Complaint and claiming it to be a forgery x x x.

On the witness stand, Atty. Ponciano C. Lobo reiterated that none of the parties is his client and that the signature appearing in the Complaint is not his x x x.

9. Sum. Proc. No. G-1205
In re: Petition for Summary Proceeding
For Declaration of Presumptive Death of
Absentee Felicitas Jabilona,
Joselito Flores, Petitioner.
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga

On 27 July 2000, a hearing was allegedly held wherein the counsel on record, Atty. Romeo B. Torno offered his evidence x x x.

Atty. Romeo B. Torno, however, testified that he did not appear before the said Court on the said time and date as he was then appearing before Branch 50; that after his ex parte presentation of evidence, the next hearing was scheduled on 27 July 2000 at 3:30 o’clock in the afternoon but the same was cancelled since he has no witness to present; and that, thereafter, there was no other hearing held or conducted in this case x x x.

On August 7, 2000, an Order was issued granting the Petition x x x.

Atty. Torno suspected that respondent Cortez prepared the same and when he confronted her, she replied that "everything is okay" x x x.

10. Civil Case No. G-3730
Ofelia Enal vs. Francisco Enal Jr.
For: Annulment of Marriage
RTC-51, Guagua, Pampanga

On 30 June 2000, an Order was issued stating that a hearing was allegedly held wherein the plaintiff testified, the Psychological Evaluation Report filed, and the case deemed submitted for resolution x x x. The records of the case, however, bear an Order dated 9 June 2000 with the same contents x x x.

On even date, 9 June 2000, a Decision was issued in favor of the plaintiff x x x.

Refuting the charges against him, respondent Judge averred in his Comment⁶ that:

a) his signatures appearing in the records of "Ofelia Enal vs. Francisco Enal, Jr., docketed as Civil Case Nos. G-3730, and "Meriam Vitug vs. Edgar Faeldon," docketed as Civil Case No. G-3675, were forgeries;

b) after the said cases were made known to him during the latter part of July 2000 and since he received complaints [from] litigants about the "activities" of respondent Galo, he conducted a discreet investigation, but stopped the same upon the filing of this complaint;

c) he is a victim of falsification and did not conspire or connive with the other respondents in the commission thereof.

On May 28, 2001, Judge Kapunan suffered from cardio-pulmonary arrest and died at the age of fifty-four. According to his heirs, the evidence of the complainant was insufficient to support the charges against their late father and, thus, sought the dismissal of the complaint.

From a mere examination of the signatures of Judge Kapunan on the questioned court records, it is clear that his signatures were not forged. As correctly pointed out by the complainant and the Investigating Justice, except for the abovementioned cases of Enal and Vitug, Judge Kapunan failed to specifically deny under oath his participation in the anomalous cases or to challenge the genuineness of his signature appearing in the court records of the questioned cases enumerated by Dabu. Thus, following Section 8, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,⁷ this amounts to an admission by Judge Kapunan that he indeed signed the questioned orders, decisions and court records.

Also, in all the questioned cases pointed out by Dabu, including the cases of Enal and Vitug, Judge Kapunan failed to offer any evidence to support his defense that his signatures therein were forged. The rule is that he who disavows the authenticity of his signature on a public document bears the responsibility of presenting evidence to that effect.⁸ Mere disclaimer is not sufficient. Under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,⁹ the genuineness of handwriting may be proved in the following manner: [1] by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write; or he has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted on or been charged; [2] by a comparison, made by a witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. At the very least, he should present corroborating witnesses to prove his assertion. At best, he should present an expert witness.¹⁰ As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.¹¹ This, unfortunately, Judge Kapunan failed to do.

At any rate, contrary to the assertions of Judge Kapunan, in the case of Vitug, the records show that as early as May 31, 2000, he already issued an order granting the appeal of the Solicitor General. He could not, therefore, claim that he was only made aware of the anomalies in Vitug after it was decided.

Further, as noted by the Investigating Justice, Judge Kapunan himself confirmed in his June 2000 report of decided cases that the cases of Lansang and Samia were among those he had decided. Thus, he could not claim that his signatures in the decisions of those cases were forged.

The Court finds specious the allegation of Judge Kapunan that the "processing" of cases were committed by Galo all by herself, and that he conducted a "discreet investigation" when he learned of her activities. Judge Kapunan offered no plausible reason why he failed to finish his investigation other than the lame excuse that he stopped his investigation due to the filing of the complaint. The reason is clear. There was no investigation conducted. As opined by the Investigating Justice,¹² had there been an investigation, Judge Kapunan should have completed it, found the culprit, filed the appropriate charges, and cleared his name.

With respect to Galo, she failed to appear in the proceedings below or file any comment, or any pleading. The proceedings below established that she received payments from litigants as "psychologist fee." She even admitted to Dabu on at least two occasions that she had "processed" certain cases involving annulment of marriage with the "go signal" of Judge Kapunan. In fact, she admitted to Dabu that she was "processing" one case where one of the parties was a friend of Judge Kapunan, upon orders of the latter.

On the other hand, Cortez admitted preparing the questioned orders, decisions, minutes of hearings, and transcripts. She tried to justify her actions by claiming that she only acted upon the instructions of Galo. Unfortunately, these circumstances do not justify her acts at all.

Taking all these into consideration, it is undeniable that Judge Kapunan, Galo and Cortez acted together in issuing questionable orders and decisions through falsification of public documents.

With regard to Tiongco, however, there is no evidence against her. The inclusion of Tiongco in this case was only upon the initiative of the Office of the Court Administrator. As the record is bereft of any evidence to hold her liable, her exoneration is in order.

Court employees, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, being public servants in an office dispensing justice, should always act with a high degree of professionalism and responsibility. Their conduct must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but must also be in accordance with the law and court regulations. No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its holder than an office in the judiciary. Court employees should be models of uprightness, fairness and honesty to maintain the people's respect and faith in the judiciary. They should avoid any act or conduct that would diminish public trust and confidence in the courts. Indeed, those connected with dispensing justice bear a heavy burden of responsibility.¹³

Falsification of an official document such as court records is considered a grave offense. It also amounts to dishonesty. Under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Administrative Code of 1987, dishonesty (par. a) and falsification (par. f) are considered grave offenses warranting the penalty of dismissal from service upon commission of the first offense.

Furthermore, falsification of an official document is punishable as a criminal offense under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and dishonesty is an impious act that has no place in the judiciary.

The penalty of dismissal, however, can no longer be imposed and carried out with respect to the late Judge Kapunan. The administrative complaints against him have become moot and academic and the case should be deemed closed and terminated following our ruling in Loyao, Jr. v. Caube¹⁴ and Apiag v. Cantero.¹⁵

WHEREFORE, finding respondents, Ma. Theresa Cortez and Leila O. Galo, GUILTY of falsification of official documents and dishonesty, the Court hereby orders their DISMISSAL from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any, with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.1avvphi1

The case against respondent Judge Eduardo Roden E. Kapunan is hereby dismissed for being moot and academic due to his untimely demise.

Respondent Suzette O. Tiongco is EXONERATED of the charges.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA Associate Justice	CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
(No Part due to prior action in OCA) PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.*** Associate Justice	ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice	ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice	LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice	ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice	(No Part) JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*** Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice	MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO Associate Justice

Footnotes

^* Passed away on May 28, 2001.

^** Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1028-RTJ.

^***No part.

¹ Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

² Rollo (A.M. No. 01-3-138-RTC), pp. 1-19.

³ Now an Associate Justice of the Court.

⁴ Rollo (A.M. No. 01-3-138 RTC), p. 20.

⁵ The investigation was first assigned to then Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals Romeo J. Callejo, Jr. who became a member of the Court in 2003.

⁶ Rollo (RTJ 00-1600), pp. 275-284.

⁷ Sec. 8. How to contest such documents. - When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding Section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.

⁸ Libres v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 176358, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 642, 655.

⁹ Sec. 22.How genuineness of handwriting proved. — The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (23a)

¹⁰ Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125283, February 10, 2006, 482 SCRA 164, 176.

¹¹ Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 753, 763 (1998).

¹² Report and Recommendation, Rollo (A.M. No. 01-3-138-RTC), p. 12.

¹³ Office of the Court Administrator v. Juan, 478 Phil. 823, 829 (2004), citing Albior v. Auguis, 452 Phil. 936 (2003) and Castelo v. Florendo, 459 Phil. 581 (2003).

¹⁴ 450 Phil. 38, 47 (2003).

¹⁵ 335 Phil. 511, 526 (1997).

Anonymous Complaint vs. Bayani; A.M No. 2007-22-SC

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 2007-22-SC               February 1, 2011

RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST MS. HERMOGENA F. BAYANI FOR DISHONESTY.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is an Anonymous Complaint for Dishonesty against Ms. Hermogena F. Bayani, SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services (OAS), Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).

The Anonymous complainant alleged that Bayani, during her application for promotion to her present position as SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Leave Division, OAS-OCA, failed to disclose in her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) that she was previously charged in an administrative case in 1995. It appeared that in a Memorandum dated February 9, 1995 issued by the OAS and signed by then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Bayani was found remiss in the performance of her duties and was recommended that she be admonished. Complainant added that Bayani's previous administrative record was discovered only during the investigation relative to A.M. No. 2007-08-SC- In Re: Fraudulent release of retirement benefits of Jose Lantin, former Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Felipe, Zambales, wherein Bayani was one of the personnel under investigation. Consequently, Bayani's failure to disclose said information misled the Court's Selection and Promotion Board (SPB) in evaluating her application for promotion which is tantamount to dishonesty.

On October 1, 2007, the OCA directed Bayani to submit her comment on the instant complaint.¹

On October 8, 2007, in her Comment/Memorandum,² Bayani presumed that the instant complaint stemmed from her answers to question nos. 25 and 27 in her PDS, which she filled up on July 27, 1999. To wit:

25. Do you have any pending a) administrative case [ ] Yes [/] No

x x x x

27. Have you ever been convicted of any administrative offense? [ ] Yes [/] No

x x x x

Bayani, however, explained that she answered "No" to question no. 25, since the administrative case against her was already decided in 1995, and before she accomplished her PDS in 1999. Thus, Bayani believed that she had no more pending case at the time she accomplished her PDS.

With regard to question no. 27, wherein she again answered in the negative, Bayani explained that it was due to her understanding that there was no conviction on the administrative case against her, because she was merely admonished and warned therein. She pointed out that pursuant to Section 15, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292, admonition and stern warning are not considered penalties. She claimed that by answering "no" to question no. 27, it was not her intention to gain advantage of getting the promotion to her current position, SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, as she was, in fact, the most qualified candidate for the position being the Officer-in-Charge since 1997.

Moreover, Bayani added that the admonition was merely by virtue of a Memorandum issued by the OAS albeit signed by then Chief Justice Narvasa. She claimed that the memorandum was not the current A.M. Resolution issued by the Court En Banc, or through its divisions.

Finally, Bayani averred that if her act was indeed wrong, she, however, did not intend to defraud the government, or prejudice anyone.

On October 10, 2007, the OCA referred the instant case to Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Chief of Office, Office of Administrative Services, Supreme Court, for appropriate action.³

On January 7, 2008, in a Memorandum,⁴ Atty. Candelaria recommended that Bayani be dismissed from service having been found guilty of Dishonesty through falsification of official documents.

The OAS maintained that while admonition or stern warning are not considered penalties, Bayani remained guilty of the charges in the previous administrative complaint against her as per OAS Memorandum dated February 9, 1995. Hence, her failure to disclose such finding of guilt in the PDS she filled up, Bayani becomes administratively liable for dishonesty.

Furthermore, the OAS pointed out that Bayani could have mentioned in the PDS that there was a previous administrative case against her, but she was only admonished instead of choosing to conceal it. The OAS emphasized that while admonition and stern warning are not penalties, still, her non-disclosure thereof constituted as dishonesty. In essence, the OAS maintained that there is no substantial difference in using "convicted" and "guilty" as long as what is intended to be made known is the existence of a previous finding of administrative liability. Thus, the OAS failed to appreciate Bayani's defense of good faith as well as Bayani's length of service.

We disagree with the OAS’s recommendation.

Indeed, dishonesty is defined as "intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion." Thus, dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state of mind at the time the offense was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment.⁵

In the instant case, the OAS would like to impress on us that Bayani is guilty of dishonesty for her deliberate failure to disclose in her PDS the existence of previous administrative case against her as evidenced by OAS Memorandum dated February 9, 1995. The OAS stressed that, while Bayani's claim that admonition and warning are not penalties, she was still found guilty in the said OAS Memorandum. The OAS explained that Bayani was just fortunate that she was not penalized for her infraction, but her conviction then subsists. Thus, we quoted the pertinent areas of the OAS Memorandum dated February 9, 1995 wherein Bayani was admonished and warned, to wit:

While this Office commends the initiative and effort of Mrs. Bayani in facilitating the immediate processing of Mr. Gingco's GSIS Clearance, during which time she prepared the first and second request for it, we could not agree to her view of putting the blame for its delay entirely to GSIS. Logic and common sense would dictate that any document which remains unacted for quite some time needs constant follow-up, through a liaison officer or directly to the agency itself, if only to determine the reason for its delay or uprise the agency concerned of its inaction, especially in cases where great prejudice will result to an individual. Had Mrs. Bayani been more prudent to check on her request for Mr. Ginco's GSIS Clearance, she would have known, assuming that the allegations of Mrs. Hernaes were true, that the clearance she was requesting for had already been forwarded to their division.

x x x x

In the case of Mrs. Hernaes, we find nothing in the records which would somehow corroborate her allegations that she had distributed the GSIS Clearance of Mr. Gingco to the processor. Both Mrs. Bayani and Mrs. Concepcion, the processors of RTC Region XI claimed that they did not receive any GSIS Clearance of Mr. Gingco. Not even the messengers (Jimmy and Noel), whom Mrs. Hernaes averred she instructed to deliver the said clearance to the processor, could categorically state that she (Mrs. Hernaes) indeed handed to them for distribution the GSIS Clearance of Mr. Gingco. Hence, this office could not help but infer from the foregoing that Mr. Gingco's GSIS Clearance, since it cannot be retrieved anymore, was lost in the hands of Mrs. Hernaes.

Premises considered, this Office finds Mrs. Bayani, Mrs. Concepcion, and Mrs. Hernaes remiss in the performance of their duties and hereby respectfully recommends that they be admonished accordingly with a stern warning that a repetition of the same and similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

x x x x⁶

A perusal of the OAS Memorandum would readily show that indeed Bayani was merely admonished and warned for being remiss in the performance of her duty. Clearly, these are not penalties. If at all, the admonition was meant as a reminder to then respondents to be diligent in the performance of their duties. Moreover, it appeared that while Bayani was included in the investigation and was later on admonished, she was not in fact principally at fault. Thus, considering these circumstances, we surmise that while Bayani made an erroneous judgment in choosing not to disclose her previous infraction, she cannot be blamed for believing that such was irrelevant to: (1) question no. 25 - for this incident had long been resolved and no longer pending; and (2) question no. 27 - for clearly being admonished and warned for being remiss in the performance for her duties do not necessarily equate to conviction as question no. 27 seeks to determine.

Furthermore, as a matter of procedure, the Selection and Promotion Board should have made the proper verification with regard to the entries Bayani made in her PDS, since her answers in question nos. 25 and 27 are easily verifiable, considering that Bayani is an employee of the Court. Moreover, the informations Bayani allegedly deliberately concealed are matters which are supposedly recorded in her employment records. It should not therefore be difficult for the board to perform their duty to assess the qualifications of all applicants for promotions based on their own inquiries; and should not just rely on the informations the applicants reveal.

Likewise, as admitted by the OAS, the subject OAS Memorandum is not an A.M. Resolution/Decision which had undergone deliberation by the Court either as en banc or through its divisions. While it was approved by then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, it appeared that the said OAS Memorandum was meant to be an internal memorandum only issued as a warning/reminder to erring court employees and was not docketed as a regular administrative matter which will also explain why it was not found out earlier.

We do not tolerate the acts of Bayani in failing to disclose in her PDS such informations which could be material and relevant in assessing her eligibility for promotion. We, however, find it harsh to punish Bayani severely for her erroneous judgment. Suffice it to say that while her defense of good faith may be difficult to prove as clearly it is a question of intention, a state of mind, erroneous judgment on the part of Bayani does not, however, necessarily connote the existence of bad faith, malice, or an intention to defraud. Be that as it may, we must emphasized that while erroneous judgment do not equate to bad faith or dishonesty, Bayani, should likewise know that prudence demands that she should disclose such information no matter how irrelevant it may appear to her.

Indeed, in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required to warrant disciplinary sanctions. We define substantial evidence as relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thus, after much consideration of the facts and circumstances, while the Court has not shied away in imposing the strictest penalty to erring employees, neither can we think and rule unreasonably in determining whether an employee deserves disciplinary sanction.1avvphi1

WHEREFORE, HERMOGENA F. BAYANI, SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services, Supreme Court, is hereby ADMONISHED and WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant the imposition of a more severe penalty.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice	CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice	ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice	ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN Associate Justice	MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD Associate Justice	MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice	JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA Associate Justice

MA. LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate Justice

Footnotes

¹ Rollo, p. 32.

² Id. at 21-22.

³ Id. at 18.

⁴ Id. at 1-9.

⁵ Office of the Court Administrator v. Flores, A.M. No. P-07-2366 [Formerly OCA-I.P.I. No. 07-2519-P], April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 82, 87.

⁶ Id. at 11-12. (Emphasis supplied.)